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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-112. Terms and Omissions Not Affecting
Negotiability
SMITH V. LENCHNER
205 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-113, infra.
SECTION 3-113. Seal
SMITH V. LENCHNER
205 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. 1964)
Lenchner, the maker of a demand note that authorized confession of
judgment at any term of court, petitioned the court to open a judgment en-
tered by confession on the note. The note was under seal. Lenchner con-
tended that the note was given under duress of a threat made by the plain-
tiff to disrupt a business negotiation, and secondly, that no consideration
was received for it. Lenchner relied on Section 3-113 in contending that
want of consideration was a good defense despite the fact that the note
was under seal. The lower court ordered the judgment to be opened.
On appeal, the order opening judgment was reversed. The court found
that there was no merit to Lenchner's contention that he was under duress
when he executed and delivered the note because there was no threat of
bodily harm or of civil or criminal prosecution.
Section 3-113 provides that "an instrument otherwise negotiable is
within this Article even though it is under seal." The court noted that even
if this section permitted the defense of want of consideration where the
note was under seal, it was first necessary for Lenchner to establish that
the note was "otherwise negotiable." This he could not do since, under
Pennsylvania case law, a note authorizing confession of judgment at any
time is non-negotiable. Section 3-112(1)(d) states only that a note's negoti-
ability is not affected by "a term authorizing a confession of judgment on
the instrument if it is not paid when due." [Emphasis supplied.] The note
being non-negotiable, the seal imported consideration.
COMMENT
The court relied on prior Pennsylvania case law to reach its decision that
the note was non-negotiable. The same result could have been reached under
the Code. Section 3-104(1)(b) provides that for an instrument to be negoti-
able, it must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain
in money but "no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the
maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article." A warrant of attorney
to confess judgment on a note is an "other . . power." While Section
3-112(1)(d) provides that a power to confess judgment on default will not
affect negotiability, neither that section nor any other authorizes the inclusion
of a power to confess judgment regardless of default at any term of court.
Therefore, the promissory note contained an unauthorized power and was
non-negotiable. Accord, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super 17,
155 A.2d 405 (1959).
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Both Thomasik v. Thomasik, 413 Pa. 559, 198 A.2d 511 (1964), and
the present case have avoided the question whether want of consideration is
available as a personal defense when the note is under seal. Under Pennsylva-
nia case law prior to the adoption of the Code, want of consideration was
held to be no defense to a note under seal but failure of consideration was
considered a good defense. The reason for the distinction was this. When no
consideration was given in the first instance, the parties were said to be rely-
ing on the seal to import consideration. But when consideration was in fact
given in the first instance, the parties were said not to be relying on the seal.
Not relying on the seal, the parties were allowed to plead failure of considera-
tion as a personal defense.
H.S.
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
SECTION 3-303. Taking for Value
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
SECTION 3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course
BURCHETT V. ALLIED CONCORD FIN. CORP.
396 P.2d 186 (N.M. 1964)
Kelly, as representative of an aluminum siding firm, called on the plain-
tiffs, the Burchetts and the Beevers, in their respective homes, offering to
install aluminum siding for a certain price. The houses were to be used as
"show houses" and both families were to receive a $100 credit on each
aluminum siding contract sold in the area, which would be applied to their
contract debt. Kelly gave them a printed contract form to read. Then he
handed them another form which they each signed without reading. What
the plaintiffs really signed were promissory notes, mortgages on their prop-
erty, and contracts with no mention of credits for advertising or sales. The
notes and mortgages were assigned to the defendant. The siding was installed
and the plaintiffs were informed by the defendant that they were delinquent
in their first payment. The plaintiffs then brought the present suit to have
the notes and mortgages cancelled and declared void, contending that they
were fraudulently procured and that a defense of fraud was available against
the defendant under Section 3-305(2)(c). That section provides:
A holder in due course ... takes free from all defenses of any party
to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt except such
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misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowl-
edge of its character or essential terms. . . .
The lower court held for the plaintiffs. On appeal, reversed and remanded
with directions to dismiss the complaints. The defendant was a holder in due
course, and the weight of the evidence did not sustain the plaintiffs' defense
of fraud under the test of Section 3-305(2)(c). The plaintiffs were of suffi-
cient intelligence, able to read and understand what they were signing, and
there was no reason why they should have relied on Kelly or had confidence
in him. Though victimized, the plaintiffs failed to exercise ordinary care for
their own protection.
H.S.
SECTION 3-501. When Presentment, Notice of Dishonor,
and Protest Necessary or Permissible
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
SECTION 3-502. Unexcused Delay; Discharge
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
SECTION 3-503. Time of Presentment
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
SECTION 3-504. How Presentment Made
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
SECTION 3-802. Effect of Instrument on Obligation for
Which It Is Given
MALPIIKOE V. HOME SAV. BANK
254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-403, infra.
SECTION 3-804. Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instruments
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
Wapner drew two checks payable to the defendant Robinson who
indorsed and delivered them to the plaintiff Dluge. Dluge presented them
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to the drawee-bank where they were dishonored for insufficient funds. The
checks were returned to Dluge who in turn handed them over to the indorser
Robinson. Subsequent to bringing this suit against Robinson, Dluge died,
and his executors were substituted as plaintiffs. At trial they contended that
Dluge demanded payment when he turned the checks over to Robinson, and
that Dluge was either a holder of the checks or an owner of lost checks who
could maintain the action under Section 3-804. Robinson denied that there
was any demand for payment and testified that he himself had returned the
checks to Wapner, the drawer. Wapner's testimony that he paid Dluge the
amount of the checks and then tore them up was stricken from the record
because Wapner was found to be an incompetent witness under the Dead
Man's Act. The lower court gave judgment to the plaintiff. On appeal, the
superior court reversed and gave judgment n.o.v. to the defendant.
The superior court reasoned that even if the plaintiffs were considered
holders in due course, they would have to prove that the checks were pre-
sented by Dluge to Robinson within a reasonable time and that for un-
certified checks a reasonable time was presumed to be within seven days
after indorsement. Sections 3-501(1) (b) ; 3-503(1) (e); 3-503(2) (b). "Pre-
sentment," it went on to quote Section 3-504(1), "is a demand for acceptance
or payment by or on behalf of a holder." Since there was no evidence to
show that Dluge made a demand for payment within seven days or any
reasonable time after indorsement, the plaintiffs could not recover even if
they were holders in due course.
They were not, however, holders in due course. Since Dluge had given
up the checks to the defendant Robinson, he was not in possession of them
and could not be a "holder" under Section 1-201(20). Not being a holder,
Dluge could not be a holder in due course under Section 3-302(1).
As to the plaintiffs' alternative argument that they could maintain the
action under Section 3-804, the court said that they must prove (1) that
Dluge owned the checks and (2) that the checks were destroyed, stolen or
otherwise lost. However, the plaintiffs could prove neither element. The
surrender of the checks without demand for payment told against Dluge's
ownership, and Wapner's evidence being stricken, there was no evidence of
destruction, loss or theft.
The court concluded by saying that the plaintiffs were free to sue on
the underlying obligations of the checks.
COMMENT
Part of the court's reasoning is based on an erroneous reading of certain
sections dealing with presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. The court
is confused as to the meaning of these terms. It suggested that present-
ment was to be made to the indorser and cited Section 3-504 (1) as proof that
such could be done. However, in quoting Section 9-504 (1) it left out several
pertinent words. "Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made
upon Me maker, accepter, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the
holder." There is no mention of indorser here. A demand for payment upon an
indorser is not presentment; it is simply a demand for payment.
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For an indorser to be liable on a check, presentment must first be made
on the drawee bank within a reasonable time. Then, if the bank refuses to
pay, notice of dishonor must be given to the indorser before midnight of the
third business day after the indorsee receives notice of dishonor from the
drawee bank, under Section 3-508. As the court correctly noted, in the case
of uncertified checks drawn and payable in the United States there is a
presumption that, if presentment or the initiation of bank collection is made
within seven days after indorsement, it is made within a reasonable time.
In the present case there is no evidence that timely presentment was not
made on the drawee bank. What the plaintiffs failed to prove was that timely
notice of dishonor was given to the indorsee, or that tardy notice was excus-
able. Thus, under Section 3-502(1)(a), the indorser Robinson was discharged.
However, as the court goes on to point out, even if timely notice of dishonor
were given, the plaintiffs could not prevail since they were neither holders
nor owners of lost, destroyed or stolen checks.
H.S.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-104. Definitions and Index of Definitions
MALPHRUS V. HOME SAV. BANK
254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-403, infra.
SECTION 4-109. Process of Posting
GIBBS V. GERBERICH
1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964)
Annotated under Section 4-303, infra.
SECTION 4-208. Security Interest of Collecting Bank
in Items, Accompanying Documents
and Proceeds
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
SECTION 4-209. When Bank Gives Value for Purposes of
Holder in Due Course
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
The plaintiff, an Arkansas bank, held a past due note executed by one of
its customers. The customer attempted to satisfy the note with a large check
payable to him, drawn on an Oklahoma bank. Before cashing the check and
discharging the note the plaintiff bank telephoned the Oklahoma bank and
asked one of its officers whether the drawer of the check had sufficient funds
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